An Ex-Felon’s Right to Franchise
Everyone makes mistakes. More importantly, most people deserve a chance to redeem themselves. This redemption should apply to prisoners post-release, especially if their crime is on the more negligible end of the scale. Unfortunately, many felons face collateral consequences of conviction in the real world after their sentence, such as voting restrictions. Such obstacles to a clean slate are unfair and unnecessary, often strengthened by a lack of federal oversight. While the federal government does outline vague constitutional boundaries, it primarily allows states to make specific, situation-based decisions regarding the rights of felons post-release. This approach often results in unequal and unjust extensions of punishments across states, depriving formerly incarcerated people of the fundamental right to vote that they are entitled to as returning citizens. Instead, considerably stronger federal baseline protections should exist to ensure that an ex-offender can truly maximize their life, as well as establish a much smaller degree of state flexibility.
The constitutional basis of post-release voting rights is undeniably the Fourteenth Amendment. This amendment, among other things, guarantees equal protection under the law, essentially eradicating discriminatory legislation. It also establishes due process, meaning that states cannot arbitrarily take away one’s fundamental rights without proper legal procedures. Of course, the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment get much narrower when it comes to prisoners. For example, while prisoners cannot be discriminated against based on protected characteristics and must live in humane conditions, prison officials are undoubtedly allowed to limit things like visitors or communication in an attempt to maintain order and safety. However, this is where the line must be drawn between incarcerated felons and previously incarcerated citizens. Someone who has completed their prison sentence is legally a member of society rather than a felon, and they must be treated as such. Furthermore, another constitutional idea that applies to the matter at hand is federalism. Ideally, states are meant to regulate procedures such as elections and employment practices, whereas the federal government provides broader oversight and sets minimum constitutional boundaries. Nevertheless, if state rulings result in an unlawful (but unintended) extension of punishments, federal power must intervene to establish a tightened baseline to avoid such conflicts in the future.
There are many examples of state power ultimately becoming detrimental to the voting rights of ex-felons. For instance, the ruling in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) allots a dangerous amount of power to states. The case arose when three California ex-felons who had completed their sentences and parole were denied the right to register to vote based on the California Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that this disenfranchisement was, surprisingly, constitutional. Their reasoning involved Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows states to exclude individuals from voting for “participation in rebellion, or other crime.”. It becomes evident that states are given the right to decide post-release voting rights for felons, revealing that there is no federal guarantee of voting rights after incarceration. Of course, this lack of federal support on the matter can create an unnecessarily wide variation between states regarding the voting privileges of ex-prisoners.
At the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that there are certain restrictions on state power in place when it comes to the franchise of released felons. Such a restriction can be found within Hunter v. Underwood (1985). A white and an African American were barred from voting under the 1901 Alabama Constitution for “presenting a worthless check”. The Alabama Constitution essentially stated the fact that those who had been convicted of crimes of “moral turpitude” were barred from voting. Unfortunately, these crimes were chosen specifically because they were thought to be committed more often by African Americans, aiming to disenfranchise them. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the law was unconstitutional because there was evidence of racial motivation behind it, as well as the intent to establish and protect white supremacy. It becomes clear through the outcome of Hunter v. Underwood that states do not have unchecked authority over the franchise of released prisoners and the federal government will intervene at times; nevertheless, the federal government does not always intervene as it did in Underwood, and more importantly, states arguably have more power than they require regardless.
The modern implications of state-sanctioned attacks on voting rights can be seen in Jones v. DeSantis (2020). This was a lawsuit challenging Florida’s law that required formerly incarcerated people to pay all their legal financial obligations before they were able to vote. Plaintiffs argued that this created an unconstitutional, indirect “poll tax” for those who were unable to pay. Ultimately, the Florida law was upheld by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals even though the District Court ruled earlier that the law was unconstitutional. First and foremost, the law introduces a wealth-based barrier that limits fair access to the polls. This is a direct violation of one’s constitutionally allotted rights! More problematically, the ruling allowed states to cleverly extend punishment beyond prison in a technical way, especially for those who struggle financially. The harmful effects of the lack of proper federal protections in this ordeal are increasingly made clear. In fact, Jones v. DeSantis serves to shine a bright light on an even more pressing issue: the wide variation between states. One state may restore the voting rights of ex-felons immediately, whereas another, such as Florida, may impose restrictions so that certain people are never able to vote after imprisonment. This enormous variation between states is extremely impractical because it means that the same person may have tremendously different rights based on their location. Overall, Jones v. DeSantis reveals a major issue in the current legal landscape; it demonstrates deference and the true amount of power that a state is given.
To conclude, it is made evident through cases such as Richardson v. Ramirez and Jones v. DeSantis that states are given an unnecessary amount of power when it comes to regulating voting rights post-release. While there are examples of very basic federal intervention, as found in Hunter v. Underwood, the power allotted to states is often misused and used to deprive returning citizens of their fundamental right of franchise. The only solution to this dangerous issue is federal intervention in the form of baseline protections. The establishment of a standard that serves to somewhat regulate the rights of ex-felons, while still leaving room for some state flexibility, will ensure that federalism is maintained along with the guaranteed protection of voting rights. The federal government must intervene to protect democracy and foster inclusivity for all, including the formerly incarcerated.
Bibliography
“Richardson v. Ramirez | 418 U.S. 24 (1974) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center.” Justia. Accessed April 27, 2026. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/418/24/.
“Hunter v. Underwood | 471 U.S. 222 (1985) | Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center.” Justia. Accessed April 27, 2026. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/222/.
“Jones v. Governor of Florida, No. 20-12003 (11th Cir. 2020) :: Justia.” Justia. Accessed April 27, 2026. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/20-12003/20-12003-2020-09-11.html.