Administrative Law and the Death of Universal Injunction
For years past, if a single federal judge in any given state in the United States found a government policy unconstitutional, a universal injunction could be issued. Effectively, this meant that one lawsuit could stop a federal policy for the entire country, which activists nationwide could take advantage of. However, in June of 2025, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. CASA, Inc. announced a decision that fundamentally altered this governmental phenomenon. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts, in general, did not possess the authority to issue a nationwide (“universal”) injunction that blocked federal policies for everyone beyond plaintiffs. The case was instigated when President Trump issued an Executive Order attempting to put an end to birthright citizenship — an issue that was blocked by three lower courts on account of it blatantly violating the Fourteenth Amendment. In terms of the SCOTUS ruling, Justice Amy Coney Barrett didn’t verify whether or not birthright citizenship was legal. Instead, the Court held that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, judges can only provide “complete relief” to plaintiffs. In other words, if someone is a plaintiff (the one who brings a case against another into court), the policy is blocked for them—but if somebody isn’t, the government can still enforce the policy against them.
The nature of this issue has catalyzed the “patchwork” problem that arose in February 2026. This was instigated in part following the 2025 decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., in which the initial question of the credibility of nationwide injunctions would redefine the purpose of a federal judge. Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s majority opinion was upheld by a “history and tradition” approach. She demonstrated, utilizing the proceedings of 18th-century British courts (the High Court of Chancery), which didn’t deal out nationwide orders, to justify that modern American judges shouldn’t either. The Court also held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided judges with only the power to manage the specific “case or controversy” of people actually in the court. Despite the Supreme Court’s historical perspective that was controversial when publicized, the most significant dispute about Trump v. CASA, Inc came after the “Complete Relief” loophole was introduced.
While the court supposedly put an end to “universal injunction" with their ruling in the 2025 case, they inadvertently birthed new arguments regarding the definition of “complete relief.” The narrow door left open by the Court pertained to a judge’s ability to issue a broad order if it is the only way to fully protect the specific plaintiff in the case. As of February 2026, many litigants are testing the boundaries of this loophole by arguing that federal policies are often "indivisible." In other words, in many regulatory scenarios, a law cannot be selectively applied to satisfy the loophole. For example, if a judge locates a new requirement in a federal database that doesn’t abide by the rights of privacy of a specific plaintiff, the government cannot cater to that person while mobilizing the rest of the system as well.
Outside of the courtroom, the impact of this decision has unfolded into a compliance nightmare at the beginning of 2026. The initial universal injunction ban (with exception for specific plaintiffs) has matured to exhibit real-world consequences for the American industry, state governments, and federal agencies. The indivisibility idea, that federal regulations cannot be tailored to one person without effectively changing for all, has fractured the current legal landscape for these sectors. In this fragmented state, the same exact executive action may or may not be law-based on where the plaintiff lives (which state) and their specific identity.
The systematic troubles that a lawsuit faces to arrive at the federal level without a universal injunction are many. Without a nationwide check, federal agencies have begun operating with unusual recklessness — including the EPA, and other agencies like the Department of Labor (DOL) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). These federal organizations have been issuing regulations that would potentially be labelled as unconstitutional under different circumstances. A jarring consequence is presented to the companies under these agencies, which are being forced to work alongside rules that may be entirely invalid. An abundance of industry strain has also begun to show through, as regulatory programs are fluctuating and cannot rely on preliminary injunctions, which fail to match belligerent federal mandates. In addition, the “compliance strategy” of a specific company depends on its headquarters, which plays a role in distorting the national market. For instance, a company headquartered in a “plaintiff-friendly” district could be free from a DOL regulation, but a company stationed in a “government-friendly” district must comply with it.
The standard issues a lawsuit endures in the governmental process expand further as “litigation fatigue” is now a pertinent factor. This fatigue is the financial, operational, and even emotional burnout that occurs during prolonged legal discrepancies. Often, parties subject to this exhaustion can prematurely close or compromise on a case, a major factor in the DOL regulations. To elucidate, while a “plaintiff-friendly” district may seem hopeful, a company may decide to continue complying with regulations because the cost of fighting it exceeds the cost of abiding by it. Furthermore, litigation fatigue is exacerbated by the ban on universal injunction because, in the past, one group could be victorious in a case for many. Their win, which previously could have handled the legal process and subsequent troubles for everyone, now must be earned in every other circuit as well. Many activists must then carefully select their legal battles, leaving some regulations, while not unnoticed, unopposed in court. This lack of opposition largely shows through financial fatigue, as single organizations don’t have the power to sue everywhere simultaneously.
Certain lawyers have been arguing for a solution in correlation with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), anticipating it’s the “universal” remedy they’re looking for. While the Supreme Court definitively limited universal injunctions in Trump v. CASA, Inc, an explicit side route was left available. The Court mentioned that “nothing we say today resolves” whether the Administrative Procedure Act allows a judge to “vacate” a regulation. The vacatur in this case is the deletion of the regulation/rule itself that the injunction would otherwise be shielding a plaintiff from. In correspondence, the APA’s power in this scenario comes from section 706 of its provision, where courts are told to “set aside” illegitimate/unlawful agency actions. Many lawyers utilize this section to uphold that this rule simply doesn’t exist for everyone, achieving virtually the same impact as a nationwide injunction. The current 2026 battle, therefore, focuses on whether or not the Supreme Court will put an end to this route as well. If the APA wording “set-aside” adopts a re-interpretation that only refers to the person suing, the executive agency’s new regulations would be effectively unalterable by smaller district courts.
Bibliography
Sidley Law Firm. “Supreme Court Substantially Limits Universal Injunctions (Trump v. CASA): Implications for Litigation Against the Government.” Accessed February 20th, 2026. https://www.sidley.com
Jackson Lewis Law Firm. “SCOTUS’s CASA Decision Ends Nationwide Injunctions, Creating Uncertainty Around Enforcement of Executive and Agency Actions.” Accessed February 21st, 2026. https://www.jacksonlewis.com
National Immigration Law Center. “Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Dangerous Decision in Trump v. CASA.” Accessed February 21st, 2026. https://www.nilc.org
Yale Journal on Regulation. “APA Vacatur and the Complete-Relief Principle.” Accessed February 25th, 2026. https://www.yalejreg.com
Cornell Law School. “5 U.S. Code § 706 - Scope of review.” Accessed February 26th, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu