Does Faith Dictate a Child's Fate?
Through these last few years, we have seen religious freedom and LGBTQ+ equality issues being sources of conflict not only in public and employment law but also, unfortunately, in the child-welfare system. Dumont v. Gordon, a civil-rights case involving two same-sex couples rejected by Michigan's taxpayer-funded child-placement agencies, reveals the extent to which religiously motivated exclusion by state-contracted providers can limit the number of families available for fostering and adopting children and thus endanger children's interests. The case led to a huge settlement and a policy change that mandated state contractors to adhere to the non-discrimination rules, yet it also created a concern regarding the extent of religious accommodation in cases that involve public funds and vulnerable children.
The depth of the question is understandable only if one knows the details of the Dumont v. Gordon case. Kristy and Dana Dumont (and another same-sex couple, the Busk-Suttons) wanted to foster and adopt in Michigan. They were sent to religious, taxpayer-funded child-placement agencies that, however, refused to work with them because the agencies had religious grounds not to serve same-sex couples. The former parents took the state and the agencies to court, claiming that the state contract and licensing system wrongly allowed state-funded discrimination against qualified families. In 2016-2017, Kristy and Dana Dumont (along with another same-sex couple, the Busk-Suttons) were looking to foster and adopt in Michigan. They were sent to sorely needed faith-based, tax-supported children's agencies that, however, would not deal with them because the latter had religious limitations on not serving same-sex couples. The would-be parents challenged the State and the agencies in court, maintaining that the State's contract and licensing arrangements unlawfully allowed state-funded discrimination against qualified families. The litigation process lasted till 2019, when the settlements were reached and a requirement for the state-contracted child-welfare agencies to accept qualified families regardless of sexual orientation was dissolved.
It is worth mentioning two legal points that are closely related. To begin with, more often than not, courts and settlements have interpreted the acceptance of public funding or a government referral by an agency as a promise to adhere to the non-discrimination stipulations of the contract— i.e., the state has the right to require the provision of services in a non-discriminatory manner as a condition of the contracting. The state’s settlement in the Dumont case basically applied that rule by making it clear that the state-contracted child-placement services have to be made available to everyone, regardless of their religion, race, gender, etc. Second, the social issue—up to what extent religious exemptions can be applied to nonprofit contractors—keeps on being hotly debated in different situations, and the US Supreme Court has heard the matter in different cases (e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia) where the issuance of narrow rulings has resulted in unresolved doctrinal tensions still remaining.
The practical results of exclusionary practices are very clear to see, no matter how sincere the intentions of faith-based organizations are. First, one effect is that they lead to a smaller number of foster and adoptive homes being available. It is the case that the LGBTQ+ population is very much the one who is left out and also the ones who are in fact willing to make the adoption, hence, the exclusion results in a significant reduction of motivated caregivers during a time where already there are inadequacies in the jurisdictions. The American Bar Association reports that the exclusion leads to prolonged foster care periods for children and less stable placements. Secondly, the policies are discriminatory since the government is funding them through taxes. The public contracts and referrals for the faith-based agencies mean the taxpayer is contributing to the disadvantage of a class of qualified citizens who are not allowed to take care of the needy children. Michigan ACLU points out that this is a matter of both equity and constitutionality: public contracting can be made nondiscriminatory without infringing on the Free Exercise Clause. Lastly, these actions negatively affect the LGBTQ+ children and families. LGBTQ+ kids are more likely to be found in the foster care system, so not having LGBTQ+ possible parents means that the families are already being stigmatized, and less choice of placement that could have been neutral to the kids’ identities is offered. There have been several occasions when advocacy groups have been able to show that the policies allowing religious refusals do not match up with the best interests of the children they are supposed to protect.
The case of Dumont v. Gordon shows us how religious accommodation cannot be considered as absolute in cases of public funding and the welfare of the most at-risk children. The Dumont case settled that the public discrimination prohibition rules apply when one accepts public referrals or contracts. The government paying for the agencies that exclude the LGBTQ+ potential parents is not only a matter of civil rights but also a matter of policy to count on the maximum number of loving and qualified homes for kids that need it. States and the federal government should take Dumont as a lesson: nondiscrimination must be the default rule where funds and children's welfare meet.
Bibliography
Buck, Melissa. UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS for the SIXTH CIRCUIT.
“Dumont v. Gordon.” American Civil Liberties Union, 2019, www.aclu.org/cases/dumont-v-gordon.
“Movement Advancement Project | Talking about Religious Exemptions & Adoption Discrimination.” Mapresearch.org, 2017, www.mapresearch.org/effective-messaging/talking-about-religious-exemptions-adoption-discrimination.
“Religious Rights of Youth in Out-of-Home Care - New York | Child Welfare Information Gateway.” Childwelfare.gov, 2024, www.childwelfare.gov/resources/religious-rights-youth-out-home-care-new-york/. Accessed 2 Nov. 2025.
Tuttle, Robert W. “Foster Care and the Growing Tension between the Religion Clauses: A Comment on Rogers v. HHS.” Scholarly Commons, 2021, scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/1564/. Accessed 2 Nov. 2025.